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Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?
PINAR BILGIN
ABSTRACT The laudable attempts at thinking past ‘Western’ IR should not
limit their task to looking beyond the spatial confines of the ‘West’ in search for
insight understood as ‘difference’, but also ask awkward questions about the
‘Westernness’ of ostensibly ‘Western’ approaches to world politics and the ‘non-
Westernness’ of others. For there may be elements of ‘non-Western’ experiences
and ideas built in to ‘Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics.
The reverse may also be true. What we think of as ‘non-Western’ approaches to
world politics may be suffused with ‘Western’ concepts and theories. Indeed,
those who are interested in thinking past ‘Western’ IR should take an additional
step and inquire into the evolution of the latter. While looking beyond the ‘West’
may not always involve discovering something that is radically ‘different’ from
one’s own ways of thinking about and doing world politics, such seeming
absence of ‘difference’ cannot be explained away through invoking assumptions
of ‘teleological Westernisation’, but requires becoming curious about the effects
of the historical relationship between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ in the
emergence of ways of thinking and doing that are—in Bhabha’s words—‘almost
the same but not quite’. This article looks at three such instances (India’s search
for nuclear power status, Turkey’s turn to secularism, and Asia’s integration
into the liberal world order) in the attempt to illustrate how ‘mimicry’ may
emerge as a way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet
unexpectedly ‘different’ way.
Following revelations about the status of the scholarly discipline of
International Relations (IR) as an ‘American social science’,1 a ‘not so
international’2 if not ‘hegemonic discipline’,3 a ‘disjunctive empire’4 and a
‘colonial household’,5 it has become a commonplace to call for thinking past
‘Western’ IR towards discovering ‘different’ ways of thinking about the
‘international’.6 And what better place is there to look for ‘difference’ than in
the ‘non-West’? This article argues that this laudable project should not limit
its task merely to looking beyond the spatial confines of the ‘West’ in search
of insight understood as ‘difference’, but should also ask awkward questions
about the ‘Westernness’ of ‘Western’ IR and the ‘non-Westernness’ of others.
This is because there may be elements of ‘non-Western’ experiences and ideas
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politics. The reverse may also be true. What we think of as ‘non-Western’
approaches to world politics may be suffused with ‘Western’ concepts and
theories. Indeed, those who are interested in thinking past ‘Western’ IR
should take an additional step and inquire into the evolution of the latter.
While looking beyond the ‘West’ may not always involve discovering
something that is radically ‘different’ from one’s own ways of thinking about
and doing world politics, such seeming absence of ‘difference’ cannot be
explained away through invoking assumptions of ‘teleological Westernisa-
tion’ (‘they all seek to become like us anyhow!’) but requires becoming
curious about the effects of the historical relationship between the ‘West’ and
the ‘non-West’ in the emergence of ways of thinking and doing that are
‘almost the same but not quite’—to use Bhabha’s turn of phrase.7
This article opens by questioning prevalent assumptions of ‘difference’
between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ approaches to world politics. It is
argued that ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ experiences as well as their various
interpretations have, over the years, clashed and fused in so many ways that
‘non-Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics are not
always devoid of ‘Western’ concepts and theories. The reverse may also be
true. What ‘we’ have come to think of as ‘Western’ IR may contain ‘non-
Western’ as well as ‘Western’ input, notwithstanding prevalent disciplinary
representations, which often sterilise the history of the ‘West’ by leaving out
‘non-Western’ challenges, interventions and contributions.
The next section considers three alternative explanations of why there is
rather limited awareness in ‘Western’ IR of ‘non-Western’ ways of thinking
about and doing world politics. Such explanations include foundational
assumptions of neo-realism (that states can be treated as like units and that
small states are of little consequence to world politics), the false promise of
Area Studies (which succeeded in neither ‘universalising’ nor ‘de-parochialis-
ing’ the social sciences), and the limited number of interlocutors who could
ideally have helped the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ to engage in conversations
on IR.
In the third section the article looks at the cases of India’s search for
nuclear status, Turkey’s turn to secularism, and Asia’s integration into the
liberal world order as three instances of what could be found when one looks
beyond the ‘West’ in search of other ways of thinking about and doing world
politics. Whereas contemporary attempts at thinking past ‘Western’ IR look
for ‘difference’ when analysing the ‘non-West’, these three examples of doing
world politics in a manner that is ‘almost the same but not quite’, suggest that
‘mimicry’ may be a way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet
unexpectedly ‘different’ way.
Problematising assumptions of ‘difference’
Challenging students of International Relations to think past its ‘ethno-
centric, masculinized, northern and top-down’ ways, Ken Booth encouraged
them to question ‘the extent to which our sense of what we do as academics


































a Liberal MP in mid-Wales (David Davies) in the aftermath of the Great
War, but instead by Dr Zungu, the admirable feminist medic she-Chief of the
Zulus’.8
Booth’s words rest on assumptions of ‘difference’: that the ‘non-West’
offers a ‘different’ take on world politics—if only ‘we’ could find out more
about it. Without wanting to underplay the importance of his point regarding
the parochialism of universalism espoused by ‘Western’ IR (not to mention
IR’s ethnocentric and masculinised take on world politics, which Booth also
problematises), it is significant, for the purposes of the argument here, to
consider the possibility that one’s efforts to think past ‘Western’ IR are not
guaranteed to get one to a place where ‘different’ ways of thinking about and
doing world politics preside.9 This is because ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’
dynamics as well as their interpretations have, over the years, clashed and
fused in far too many different ways—ways that are not always acknowl-
edged. While the role played by the ‘West’ in inventing the ‘Third World’,10
the ‘Orient’11 and ‘Africa’12 is reasonably well documented, the former’s
debts to the latter are little known.13 Franz Fanon reminds us that it is
Europe that ‘is literally the creation of the Third World’ in the sense that it
was ‘the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow
races’ that have fuelled its ‘opulence’.14 Likewise, Amartya Sen warns against
‘praising an imagined insularity’. ‘Given the cultural and intellectual
interconnections in world history’, he writes, ‘the question of what is
‘‘Western’’ and what is not would be hard to decide.’15
If the world has remained oblivious to such interconnections, this is partly
because the ‘West’ has usurped not only the material resources of the ‘non-
West’ but also its image of itself as a subject, as opposed to a mere object, of
history.16 Particularly insightful for the argument here is Timothy Mitchell’s
re-presentation of modernity not as a ‘stage’ but as a particular way of
‘staging’ history. Rejecting both representations of modernity as a product
of the ‘West’, and the revisionist accounts that view modernity as a product
of the encounter and interaction of the ‘West’ with the ‘non-West’, Mitchell
makes a case for understanding it as a particular way of ‘staging’ history that
erases the ‘plural genealogy and ecology’ of the overall process of the
production of ‘modernity’. He writes:
The identity claimed by the modern is contaminated. It issues from too many
sources and depends upon, even as it refuses to recognize, forebears and forces
that escape its control. To overlook these differences requires a constant
representing of the homogenous unity of modernity’s space and time.17
The examples of such erasure highlighted by Mitchell include the ‘non-
Western’ origins of ostensibly ‘Western’ ideas such as ‘modernism’ (in 1890
by a ‘Nicaraguan poet, writing in a Guatemalan journal, of a literary
encounter in Peru’); ‘postmodernism’ (born in the 1930s Hispanic world,
introduced to the USA by Ihab Hassan, ‘the son of a provincial governor
in Egypt’); ‘the population’ and ‘culture’ (both ‘probably first occurred in
the colonized non-European regions’), and ‘liberalism’ (in the evolution of

































which India ‘played a sustained role . . . [by] exposing it to a constitutive
ambivalence’).18
An IR example of such ‘imagined insularity’19 could be found in the
‘democratic peace’ literature, which rests on assumptions regarding the
theory and practice of democracy being products of the ‘West’, often
oblivious to the ways in which liberal democracy (as with capitalism) has had
multiple places of birth20—not to mention the historical relationships of war
and intervention, which have helped to keep the zone of ‘democratic peace’
‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’, while allowing other parts of the world to remain
‘not-so-peaceful’ and ‘not-so-democratic’.21 As they overlook the (unin-
tended) consequences for the ‘non-West’ of the emergence of ‘democratic
peace’ in the ‘West’, IR scholars lament the absence of liberal democracy in
these areas which, they worry, render difficult (if not impossible) the
emergence of democratic peace world-wide. While capturing such inter-
connections requires becoming aware of and acknowledging the role played
by modernity not as a stage but as a way of ‘staging’ history, contemporary
accounts often write back into history the current stalemate between radical
elements of the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ with an admixture of ‘culturalist’
rationale.22
Perhaps more significantly, IR, as studied in the USA, not only fails to
capture such historical relationships but has also been complicit in shaping
them. While the consequences of the hegemonic aspirations of the USA for
the development of disciplinary social sciences,23 political science24 and
International Relations25 have been recognised, very little is known about
how such dynamics have affected ways of thinking about and doing world
politics elsewhere. The spread of US approaches to other parts of the world,
which gained pace in the postwar era, is often explained with reference to the
emergence of the USA as the ‘dominant producer of both ideas and things’,26
which coincided with and provided a basis for the modernisation and/or
Westernisation projects of elites in various parts of the world.27
However, seeking answers in assumptions of ‘teleological Westernisation’
as such does not suffice. Those concepts and theories that travelled from the
‘West’ to the ‘non-West’ and the channels through which they travelled
(mostly through US-sponsored scholarships and grants to ‘non-Western’
individuals and institutions) were not unrelated to US interests; nor were they
independent of US policy making. These concepts and theories provided
back-up to US policy making in at least three ways: first, by directly
informing US policy making towards the ‘non-West’; second, by providing
the tools with which ‘non-Western’ actors could set up their own
‘modernising nation-states’ and/or ‘national security states’; and third, as
ideological tools that rendered ‘natural’ the policies adopted and implemen-
ted in the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’.
During the early postwar period concepts and theories developed by US
scholars working on ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ were exported to the
‘non-West’ through scholarships and fellowships or bilateral training and
exchange programmes available to students, scholars and policy practi-


































embraced ‘modernisation’ and/or ‘national security’ as policy tools. Even in
those places such as India or Egypt where US political influence was met with
scepticism, the influence of US-originated concepts such as ‘security’ and
‘development’ was undeniable. ‘National security’ was utilised
in India’s case, providing a basis for building a regional hegemonic order; in the
case of Pakistan, providing a raison d’être for that country as a separate
homeland. Given these two meanings, ‘national’ security is correlated with
different articulations of political space in the region. In Gramscian language
the national security project in Pakistan serves legitimation purposes, albeit not
very successfully. By contrast, India has sought regional leadership in the name
of national security.28
One specific product of such synergy between the US scholarly community
and the policy world has been models of military-led development, which
were popularised during this period. During the 1950s, as US policy making
increasingly turned towards ‘non-Western’ militaries as allies in maintaining
stability in the ‘Third World’ (thereby recalibrating civil –military balances to
the benefit of the latter), US scholarly writings provided the rationale. The
main difference between policy making and scholarly approaches was that
whereas policymakers appeared content to identify the reasons for endorsing
greater involvement of the US military and its local counterpart in
Development programs, policy scientists and those who regarded themselves
as allied theoreticians of Development rationalized the role in romantic terms.29
These scholars were not prepared to advocate a militarisation of politics.
Instead they provided a ‘rationale rich in psychology and history’ as to why
civilians in the ‘Third World’ suffered from a ‘post-colonial syndrome’ that
led them to react against the ‘West’, whereas ‘a sense of security’ seemed to
enable military leaders to ‘accept the weakness of their countries in relation
to the West’. Such ostensibly ‘scientific’ basis, in turn, allowed scholars to
propagate ‘myths of Development that simultaneously supported the view of
the military as models of democratic, non-authoritarian training while
arguing that the militarization of politics was an undesirable failure of Third
World politics’.30
Thus US-originated understandings and practices of ‘national security’
and ‘development’ were exported to ‘non-Western’ locales in a context
characterised by the convergence of the US national security agenda of
maintaining stability by way of encouraging military-led modernisation, and
of the ‘non-Western’ actors’ agenda of seeking security through sovereign
development. Whereas US policy makers and the scholarly community
provided the logistical and conceptual back-up, local actors stepped in to
shape domestic political processes in line with their own preferences. It is an
ironic twist of history that those ostensibly ‘Western’ concepts such as
‘national security’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘development’, which have helped make
these ‘non-Western’ ‘realities’ are now found wanting in providing scholarly
explanations of the very same ‘realities’.

































The broader argument here is that ‘non-Western’ insecurities did not
evolve in a vacuum. They evolved through interaction with the USA—its
ways of thinking about and doing world politics. These relationships made
their mark on US IR as well. Scholarly writings did not merely inform
practice; they were also shaped by the policy context. Even those scholars
who shied away from establishing explicit ties with the policy world could not
prevent their studies from being shaped by the ‘enemy’ or ‘friend’ images
fashioned for and through foreign policy practices. Such images and
assumptions informed ostensibly ‘objective’ accounts, thereby shaping US
ways of thinking about and doing world politics.31
It is this web of relationships between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ (and
their ways of thinking about and doing world politics) that renders
problematic the expectations of finding ‘difference’ in the ‘non-West’. This
is not to deny the diversity in the experiences and priorities of the ‘West’ and
the ‘non-West’. Rather the aim here is to point to the problems involved in
the efforts to look towards the ‘non-West’ in search for radical ‘difference’
while overlooking the factors and actors that help produce ways of thinking
about and doing world politics in a manner that is ‘almost the same but not
quite’. This point will be further developed in the following section, which
considers alternative explanations of to why ‘Western’ IR offers so little about
‘non-Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics.
Why does IR offer so little about the ‘non-West’?
Three alternative explanations will be considered: the prevalence of neo-
realist assumptions that do not encourage students to be curious about ‘non-
Western’ parts of the world; the false promise of Area Studies, which failed to
work with the disciplines to allow for cross-fertilisation to occur; and the
relatively small number of interlocutors who could ideally have set up
conversations between the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’. Each explanation will
be treated in turn.
The disciplinary straightjacket of neo-realism
IR (especially its neo-realist variant) has not always been interested in the
world beyond the great powers. ‘Denmark does not matter’ quipped
Kenneth Waltz, underlining the marginality of smaller states to system
theorising.32 This is not only because those who are in the peripheries of
world politics are also relegated to the peripheries of one’s thinking. It is
also because neo-realism teaches students of International Relations to
focus on great powers and think of them as like units, the internal
dynamics of which are of little consequence for world politics. The choices
made in favour of conducting state- and great power-centric analyses have
had implications for ‘Western’ IR. Throughout the years critical scholars
have been documenting the implications of such methodological and
epistemological choices,33 thereby preparing the groundwork for the project


































Whereas students of the ‘Third World’ have long warned about what
Baghat Korany referred to as the ‘increasing irrelevance’ of ‘standard’
concepts and theories in explaining the dynamics of non-Western locale,34
‘Western’ approaches, even as they focused on the ‘non-West’, have failed to
be fully relevant to the concerns of people, states and societies in the ‘non-
West’. This is because analyses of ‘sage bush wars’, ‘low intensity conflicts’
and ‘guerrilla wars’ focused on and thus were able to capture only the threat
perceptions and interest calculations of the ‘West’. Put differently, the ‘non-
West’, even when it was made the focal point of IR, was not treated as the
referent object (what/who needs protection).35
In those instances when they became the focal point of analyses, ‘non-
Western’ states (and non-state actors) were slotted into one of the two roles
that were available. Either they were considered as part of the ‘established
paradigm, and assigned the role of junior-partners in the power game’ or they
were labelled ‘trouble-makers’, thriving on ‘nuisance power’, fit for the
exercise of counter-insurgency techniques discussed in the literature.36
Although this has begun to change in recent years, with more attention
being paid to the insecurities of individuals, social groups and states in the
developing world (as with the emergence of concerns about and the literature
on ‘human security’), the inordinate amount of attention paid to ‘state
failure’ should serve as a reminder of the persistence of the aforementioned
dynamics (of putting ‘Western’ insecurities first when studying ostensibly
‘non-Western’ dynamics). For, although the shift in mainstream security
analyses from purely military to broader ‘human security’ concerns may be
considered a ‘good thing’, state ‘weakness’ is still portrayed as a problem by
virtue of ‘weak’ states’ inability to prevent their territories from being used as
a safe harbour by terrorists—not because those states fail to deliver the
necessary goods and services to their citizens. So-called ‘strong’ states of the
‘non-West’, in turn, even when they fail to prioritise their citizens’ concerns,
are not considered to be a problem as long as they remain attentive to
‘Western’ security interests.37
To recapitulate, one explanation as to why ‘Western’ IR has produced
relatively little about ‘non-Western’ ways of thinking about and doing world
politics has to do with the disciplinary straitjacket imposed by IR as a social
science, in that students of world politics have not been socialised into being
curious about the ‘non-West’ but have been encouraged to explain away
‘non-Western’ dynamics by superimposing ‘Western’ categories.
The false promise of Area Studies
The promise of Area Studies, when it was initially founded in the late 1940s,
was that of making the social sciences a ‘whole’ and their findings of
‘universal’ relevance by providing data about ‘non-Western’ parts of the
world. Thus the political scientist Gabriel Almond called on his colleagues to
study the ‘uncouth and exotic’ regions of the world in order to make political
science a ‘total science’.38 In time this division of labour between the students
of disciplines and areas became a hierarchical one. In a manner reminiscent

































of the ‘upstairs, downstairs’ dynamics of a colonial household,39 disciplinary
generalists looked down upon their Area Studies colleagues, who produced
the ‘thick descriptions’ they needed to theorise grandly about the world. One
unfortunate outcome of the institutionalisation of this hierarchical division
of labour in ‘Western’ IR has been the failure of Area Studies to fulfil the task
of making the social sciences less parochial and more ‘universal’.
Leaving aside the issue of the desirability and/or feasibility of such a task,
what should be noted here is that, in time, efforts came to focus almost
exclusively on representing the ‘non-West’ as part of an ostensibly ‘universal’
story told in and about the ‘West’.40 Whereas the original task would have
required disturbing the unquestioned dominance of ‘Western’ ways of
knowing, in time efforts were directed towards adopting and ‘testing’ those
frameworks that were developed in the ‘West’. Ideally, such testing should
have allowed for further development of the theories at hand, thereby
contributing to the project of achieving ‘universal’ knowledge. However, the
overbearing authority of the disciplines made it very difficult for Area Studies
scholars to penetrate the disciplines.
One implication of the entrenchment of this hierarchical division of labour
has been the emergence of a body of work that explicitly or implicitly rejects
the relevance of ‘theory’. This, in turn, is mostly the result of a frustration
with the limited relevance of existing analytical frameworks while IR
continues to gloss over cultural – historical context,41 an (unintended)
consequence of which is the limited relevance of ‘Western’ concepts and
theories in understanding ‘non-Western’ (and global) dynamics.
Interlocutors are in short supply
A third explanation as to why knowledge about the study of IR in the ‘non-
West’ has remained limited has to do with the inadequate number of
interlocutors from the ‘non-West’ who could have informed their ‘Western’
counterparts about ways of thinking about and doing world politics in their
own locale. Working at institutions far away from the disciplinary discipline
exercised by both neo-realism and the hierarchical division of labour between
disciplinary IR and Area Studies, ‘non-Western’ scholars could be considered
ideally situated to thinking past ‘Western’ IR and producing ‘different’
insights. Nonetheless, the limited number of studies espousing such
‘difference’ suggests that the study of world politics in the ‘non-West’ may
not have transpired as expected: what is found in ‘non-Western’ scholars’
treatises on world politics is not always radical ‘difference’ (as is expected of
them) but ‘similarity’.42
In ‘non-Western’ scholars’ work ‘similarity’ emerges as research that has
been filtered through ‘Western’ concepts and packaged in ‘Western’
categories. Some have explained the emergence of ways of thinking and
doing that are ‘almost the same but not quite’ with reference to the training
many ‘non-Western’ scholars receive. They are, to use Donald Puchala’s
choice of words, ‘social science socialized products of American graduate


































been taught. There may be an element of truth to this characterisation in that
being exposed to US or other ‘Western’ training in IR leaves its mark on the
thinking as well as professional practices of its students. Yet it is important
not to slip from pointing to the effects of ‘Western’ IR on ‘non-Western’
scholars to assuming that they have ‘thoroughly digested the norms and
parameters of Western IR’.44 Whereas the former allows the possibility of
scholars to be other than what they are taught (as with some ‘Western’
institutions choosing to encourage their students to think past ‘Western’ IR),
the latter does not.
Frustrated with what they consider to be ‘social science socialized’ IR
scholars from the ‘non-West’ and in search of ‘difference’, some ‘Western’
scholars have turned to ‘Third World radicals’45 and found exactly what they
were looking for: treatises on the various ways in which the strong have
exploited the weak. Others who turned to non-IR sources such as literature,
drama and philosophy46 found alternative ‘visions and articulations of
relations between political communities’.47 Without wanting to under-
estimate the significance of inquiring into such radically ‘different’ visions
of security and community, it is nevertheless important to underscore one
issue: the ways in which the current state of ‘non-Western’ IR (‘almost the
same but not quite’) is taken for granted and not problematised is in itself
problematic. This is not least because such a stance rests on two prevalent
assumptions: 1) ‘difference’, which is the default position of the ‘non-West’;
and 2) ‘teleological Westernisation’, ie the notion that Westernisation is a
desirable if not inevitable end-point for the ‘non-West’. These two
assumptions tell students of IR to expect those who are in a position of
‘weakness’ to have radically ‘different’ ideas compared with those who are in
a position of ‘strength’—as they often do. However, when ‘non-Western’
scholars’ writings do not exhibit such ‘difference’ but appear to be similar to
those of their ‘Western’ counterparts, ‘non-Western’ scholars are represented
as the robotic ‘Stepford Wife’ to ‘Western IR’, the engineer.48 There is no
puzzle for anyone it seems, in the former’s adoption of those ‘standard’
concepts and theories developed by and for the purposes of the latter. They
are ‘social science socialized products’49 of ‘Western’ IR who have
‘thoroughly digested [its] norms and parameters’.50 Needless to say, such a
stance denies agency to ‘non-Western’ scholars and represents them as
unthinking emulators.
The emergence of ways of thinking and doing that are ‘almost the same but
not quite’ in and through ‘non-Western’ scholars’ studies is worth inquiring
into not least because such works may be treated as a subject of analysis in
their own right and interpreted as yet another instance of ‘mimicry’. That is
to say, while what ‘non-Western’ scholars ‘say’ about world politics may not
be found to be of interest, how they say what they say—ie through the
adoption of ‘Western’ concepts and categories—is nevertheless worth
inquiring into.51
The same point could be made regarding non-Western actors’ practices in
general, which, in turn, would allow going beyond unthinking assumptions
of ‘teleological Westernisation’. Interestingly, even the critics of such

































assumptions who point to the workings of ‘Western’ hegemony are not
immune to ‘epistemological Orientalism’ in that they explain ‘mimicry’ with
reference to a ‘Western masculinist capitalism’ that ‘absorbs if not
obliterates, pre-capitalist forms of production, consumption and hege-
mony’.52 The following section looks at three instances of ‘mimicry’ in
‘non-Western’ practices of world politics and seeks to point to the agency and
agenda of the ‘non-Western’ that are overlooked by ‘standard’ accounts.
Postcolonial insights
For those who remain curious about the emergence of ‘similarity’ as well as
difference in/by the ‘non-West’, a particularly useful key is provided by
postcolonial studies. Bhabha’s concept of ‘mimicry’ helps us to ponder the
rationale behind the ‘non-Western’ search for ‘similarity’. Rejecting the
short-cut offered by assumptions of ‘teleological Westernisation’, Bhabha
introduces the concept of ‘mimicry’ as ‘the sign of a double articulation; a
complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline which ‘appropriates’
the Other as it visualises power. Mimicry is also the sign of the
inappropriate, however, a difference or recalcitrance which coheres the
dominant strategic function of colonial power, intensifies surveillance,
and poses an immanent threat to both ‘normalised’ knowledges and
disciplinary powers’.53
Introducing the concept of ‘mimicry’ to IR, Ling underscores the ‘survival’
instinct of the colonized. Mimicry, writes Ling:
allows the colonized to try on, like a new accessory, the colonizer’s reflected
image in the body/site of the ‘native’. A moment of political destabilization
rather than fawning flattery, mimicry subverts the hegemonic contention that
the colonizer is always separate from and superior to the colonized.54
By so doing, Ling also pre-empts those critics who allege that postcolonialism
reduces the ‘colonized’ to being nothing but that. Seeking to become ‘almost
the same but not quite’ is not for lack of ‘authentic’ grounds upon which
modernity can be erected,55 but for purposes of survival in the face of the
‘colonizer’’s authoritative claims over the right to ‘better’ rule, which, in turn,
lays the ground for colonial conquest. By ‘disclosing the ambivalence of
colonial discourse [mimicry] also disrupts its authority’56 and removes the
ground for the ‘West’ to claim the capacity and the right to better rule,
thereby making room for sovereign development.
In what follows this section of the article offers three examples to illustrate
how ‘mimicking’ ‘Westernness’ may emerge as a deceptively ‘similar’ yet
altogether ‘different’ way of doing world politics. One advantage to this
approach is that it permits recognition of the agency and agenda of ‘non-
Western’ actors in adopting, adapting or bypassing ‘Western’ ways of
thinking about and doing world politics. The point is that ‘non-Western’



































Modernity as security: India and the nuclear bomb
In 1974 India exploded its first ‘peaceful’ nuclear weapon. From 1974 until
May 1998 (the year when it conducted five more tests) India remained a
nuclear weapons-capable state that respected the test-ban treaty, negotiated
at various non-proliferation fora and did not officially announce its nuclear
power status. Neo-realist accounts of India’s 1974 and 1998 tests see little to
be puzzled about, portraying them as security-seeking behaviour through
military means as conditioned by international anarchy.57 Those who contest
neo-realist accounts, in turn, point to the absence of a direct military threat
to India’s security which could have justified a nuclear response. Instead, they
emphasise the age-old realist concern of the ‘search for power’ as driving
India’s policies. India has sought the ability to ‘influence others to behave as
it wants them to and, conversely, to resist the unwelcome influence of others’,
maintains one author.58
Students of Area Studies who doubt the explanatory power of such
conceptual categories in the Indian context emphasise domestic dynamics.
While the emphasis they place upon the role of domestic leadership is
illuminating in terms of understanding Indira Ghandi’s search for legitimacy
during the 1970s, it goes only so far in explaining India’s stance towards
nuclear weapons. This is because students of Area Studies as well as their
disciplinary-oriented counterparts fail to ask (and answer) the following
compelling questions: ‘why would a nuclear explosion be the means by which
a leader seeks to bolster sagging support?’ and ‘what was so compelling about
a nuclear explosion that would give a government the popular legitimacy it
sought?’.59 Seeking answers to these questions as opposed to explaining away
India’s nuclear dynamics with reference to ostensibly ‘universal’ strategic
reasoning (neo-realist IR’s answer) or domestic political quibbling (Area
Studies answer) should lead students of world politics to be curious about
differences in security understanding that run below surface resemblances in
behaviour.
India’s relationship with the nuclear bomb suggests that both ‘similarity’
and ‘difference’ between the ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ are (re)produced through
the historical web of relationships between the two as opposed to being
purely ‘cultural’ (‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’). Itty Abraham’s study of
India’s nuclear bomb reveals numerous layers of such interaction between the
domestic and the international, and the ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’. The
nuclear bomb was linked with security in the minds of Indian intelligentsia,
argues Abraham, not only due to (regional and global) ‘power politics’
concerns but also through a particular understanding of ‘national security’
that was ‘imported’ from the ‘West’ (read USA) in the aftermath of World
War II, and served as a theory (and ideology) of the modern Indian state. In
the postwar context theories of national security and development ‘came to
set the conceptual limits to national ‘‘pathways to progress’’’,60 understood
in the ‘non-West’ as becoming ‘modern’. Given the prevalence of the
discourse of ‘modernity-as-a-Western-thing’ and ‘Western’ claims to
dominate and/or rule being legitimated on grounds of being ‘modern’

































(as opposed to the ‘traditional’ ways of others), becoming ‘modern’ emerged
as a form of resisting the ‘West’, removing the grounds for future
interventions or domination. Accordingly, India’s nuclear bomb could
be considered as a component of this security policy of locating oneself
in the ‘modern’ world so as to remove the ground for external inter-
ference. What comes out of Abraham’s account of the Indian atomic
bomb is a novel use of a military instrument for purposes of non-military
security in a way not anticipated by the ‘Western’ minds behind nuclear
weapons.
Secularization as security: Turkey through postcolonial lenses61
As part of the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of
Turkey, leaders of the revolutionary movement made a number of radical
breaks with the past. These include the declaration of a republic and the
adoption of democracy and secularism as its constitutive principles. The
decision by a Muslim majority state to forego ‘Islam’ as one of the governing
and/or legitimating principles and adopt secularism was, at the time,
represented by the leadership as well as by its observers as part of an
attempt to leave ‘traditions’ behind and become ‘modern’.62 True to the logic
of secularisation theory, it was suggested that religion had no place in a
‘modern’ future and was thus to be left outside the future of Turkey.
From the perspective of neo-realism Turkey’s turn to secularism would be
of little interest, for it has little to do with international relations but much to
do with domestic politics. From the perspective of Area Studies Turkey’s
secularisation emerges as a policy choice peculiar to its own dynamics and, in
particular, to the Ottoman experience with ‘Islam’. Those readings more
attuned to ‘critical’ concerns recognise a ‘governmentality’ rationale in the
decision to turn to secularism,63 but they focus purely on domestic concerns
to the neglect of the historical relationship between the Ottoman Empire and
the ‘West’. The long-neglected international relations aspect of Turkey’s
secularisation has at least three dimensions.64
First, there is an international (as well as domestic) security dimension to
the abolition of the Caliphate in 1922; it was abolished partly because it was
complicating relations with European powers for ‘[t]hey either suspected
Turkey constantly of scheming against their sovereignty, or else they
themselves were involved in intrigue in Turkey in order to get control of the
Caliphate and use it on behalf of their own ambitions’.65 Abolishing the
Caliphate in 1924 removed the grounds for such future intervention into
Turkey’s affairs. It also removed a cloud of suspicion regarding the ambitions
of the revolutionary leadership by making it clear that these were limited to
the boundaries of the new Turkey.
Second, there was the problem of the claim of European powers to the
right to interfere on behalf of the rather few non-Muslims left within
the boundaries of the new Turkey. The grounds for making such claims had
to be removed if Turkey was to sustain its existence as a sovereign state.


































independence’ fought against some of the victorious powers of World War I
who had planned to divide up some of Turkey’s territories among
themselves) members of the delegations of European powers had challenged
Turkey’s jurisdiction over the ‘minorities’ (non-Muslim citizens) and wanted
to maintain the right to intervene on their behalf as they did during the
Ottoman times.66 Turkey’s turn to secularism was partly to prevent such
interference in the future.
The third international dimension to Turkey’s turn to secularism emerges
through a reading of Turkey’s project of modernisation and of ‘gaining
respect in the eyes of the civilised world’ as part of a solution to a security
problem. As with Ottoman attempts at Westernisation, Turkey’s grand
project of Westernisation is almost always explained as an attempt to achieve
the level of and/or join ‘contemporary civilisation’. In such explanations, the
‘international’ dimension is acknowledged, but it is represented either as a
‘lifestyle choice’ or as a purely instrumental move to prevent military decline.
However, both the Ottoman and Turkish Westernisations were more than
that. They were attempts to become a member of ‘contemporary civilisation’
not only to provide an end to battlefield losses but also to remove the ground
for ‘European’ interventions and claims to the right to rule the ‘uncivilised’.
Postcolonial movements around the world have had to fight not only the
forces but also the culture of imperialism,67 for the latter allowed the former
to occur. The culture of imperialism, together with an Orientalist mindset,68
provided the basis for the ‘West’s claim to enjoy ‘the right to better rule’
‘non-Western’ peoples. It was on the basis of such claims that ‘European’
actors had interfered numerous times in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire.69
Viewed as such, Turkey’s turn to secularism, as the centrepiece of the project
of Westernisation, could be considered as a part of a strategy adopted by the
leaders of the revolutionary movement to cope with a specific security
problem—a strategy of seeking to become ‘similar’ in a world that was
perceived to be not-so-hospitable to ‘difference’.
Integration into the liberal world order as security: Asia and the ‘West’
As IR continues to be puzzled by China’s ‘Red Capitalists’,70 Asian actors
have long sought integration into the liberal world order through
Westernisation schemes of various sorts. While it is possible to explain away
Asia’s interactions with the ‘West’ with reference to ‘teleological Wester-
nisation’, or by reducing it to a struggle for supremacy in a world system
characterised by anarchy and cut-throat capitalism, and/or with reference to
cultural characteristics, the very hybrid nature of the end-product calls for
the use of tools more adept in tackling ‘non-Western’ similarity/difference. As
yet not even the more culturally attuned International Society School is
helpful in understanding Asia’s integration into the liberal world order, for it
takes Asian actors’ attempts at Westernisation as a part of their search for
recognition as equal members of international society. Be that as it may, the
International Society School does not help us understand Japan’s (among
others) search for security against colonial powers of the ‘West’ by colonising

































the ‘East’.71 Critical of International Society accounts, Suzuki explains
Japan’s search for colonies as a part of its attempt to escape being colonised
by the ‘West’ given the ‘Janus-faced’ character of European/international
society’. He writes:
Many non-European states which were incorporated into European Interna-
tional Society in the course of European imperialism did not only witness the
norms of ‘toleration’ and ‘coexistence’. They also witnessed the European
International Society which often aggressively intervened in their land in order
to bring them closer to ‘civilization’.72
Japan, according to Suzuki, acquired colonies partly in an attempt to become
‘similar’, having recognised the advantages membership of European/
international society presented in terms of justifying its own empire.
Ling offers an alternative reading of the search for ‘similarity’ in different
parts of Asia as ‘the most direct means of survival despite [its] self-denying,
self-humiliating implications’.73 Viewed this way, interactions with the ‘West’
and eventual integration into the liberal world order emerge as an instance of
‘post-colonial learning’ through which ‘the powerless eventually learn to
reconcile, synthesize, and hybridize across opposing systems thereby turning
an irrational imposition of power into a rational mechanism for survival and,
possibly, prosperity’.74
While puzzled by the nature as well as the pace of Asia’s transformation,
‘Western’ IR remains oblivious to the ways in which the production of ways
of thinking and doing that are ‘almost the same but not quite’ by Asian
actors has not only changed Asia but has also altered the ‘West’. Ling
explains:
Elites in Asia have learned from the West by absorbing, adopting and
reformulating elements of the Western other into the Asian self. Similarly, elites
in the West have derived from Asia profound social, cultural, psychological,
political and now economic consequences that come from their construction of
the ‘Oriental’ Other. Each world order mirrors the other in alternating waves of
hypermasculinized conquest, such as military or economic imperialism,
followed by hyperfeminized exploitation, such as sex trafficking, mail-order
brides, and comfort women.75
To recapitulate, after having reconsidered the often taken-for-granted
‘Westernness’ and ‘non-Westernness’ of existing ways of thinking about
and doing world politics, and pointed to the ways in which viewing the two as
radically ‘different’ is allowed by ‘Western’ IR, which denies its own
complicity in the shaping of relations between the two, this article has
looked at three examples of what is to be found when one looks beyond the
spatial confines of the ‘West’. Viewed together, these three examples from
India, Turkey and Asia (the first a ‘straightforward’ military security act the
reasoning behind which suggests a different explanation than provided by the


































which requires an IR explanation not captured by the literature; the third the
product of hybridity in Asia via mimicry in the attempt to survive in the
liberal world order) help to reinforce the point that becoming curious about
the production of ‘similarity’ can provide insight into ‘non-Western’ ways of
thinking about and doing world politics. It also constitutes an alternative
way of thinking past ‘Western’ IR—a way that assumptions of radical
‘difference’ and ‘teleological Westernisation’ do not allow.
Conclusion
Given the limits (in terms of breadth and depth) of what is known about
‘non-Western’ ways of thinking and doing world politics, attempting to think
past ‘Western’ IR is a challenge. Such a task has become even more
challenging as a result of the world political context characterised by the 11
September 2001 attacks and other al-Qaida-linked bombings in Bali (2002),
Madrid (2004) and London (2005). While questioning one’s own way of
doing things is never easy it has arguably been made even more difficult by
the growing perception that the ‘West’ is ‘under attack’. Although al-Qaida
has not proven to be discriminating in terms of the identity of its victims, the
consequences of its actions have created the impression of a ‘West’ under
threat by the forces of so-called ‘global jihadism’. Seeking to think past
‘Western’ IR at such a time of perceived global insecurity is not easy.
Notwithstanding the potential benefits to be accrued from self-questioning
and critique, many policy makers, as well as those problem-solving theorists
of IR,76 more often than not think in terms of the ‘next election and not the
next generation’77 and react by circling the wagons rather than encouraging
debates. That said, the current state of global insecurity could also be viewed
as a wake-up call of sorts. It is in this spirit that this article has sought to
contribute to the attempt at thinking past ‘Western’ IR.
The article did not attempt to trace the ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’ origins
of various ideas and practices. Edward W Said advised against such attempts:
To prefer a local, detailed analysis of how one theory travels from one situation
to another is also to betray some fundamental uncertainty about specifying or
delimiting the field to which any one theory or idea might belong.78
Rather, the article sought to destabilise prevalent assumptions that lead one
to expect to find radical ‘difference’ in ‘non-Western’ ways of thinking about
and doing world politics. It also sought to encourage students of IR to be
curious about ‘non-Western’ ways even when they seem ‘similar’ to the point
of coming across as ‘uninteresting’. The article sought to show that such
seeming ‘similarity’ may be rooted in policies of survival shaped in an
international political context characterised by an unequal division of labour
and distribution of power. What is more, this may be true not only for ‘non-
Western’ policy making, but also for ‘non-Western’ scholarly studies of IR.
That is to say, if ‘non-Western’ scholars come across as ‘social science
socialized’ products of ‘Western’ IR, the domestic and international politics

































of such socialisation is worth inquiring into. Arguably such inquiry into the
agency of the ‘non-West’ in the production of ways of thinking and doing
that are ‘almost the same but not quite’ will allow the project of thinking past
‘Western’ IR to further flourish.
There is no way of knowing what IR would have looked like ‘had the
subject been founded in universities not by a Liberal MP in mid-Wales . . . but
instead by . . . the admirable feminist-medic she-Chief of the Zulus’. There is
also no way of knowing whether such a beginning would have allowed
students of IR to think past its current ‘ethnocentric, masculinized, northern
and top-down character’.79 While it is fascinating to speculate about what
might have been, it is also interesting to inquire into what has already been.
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